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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Whether the Third District Court erred in denying

defendant's Motion For New Trial as the prosecutor, during his
summation, unfairly called attention to what he characterized as
an oversight on the part of defense counsel in allowing the
defendant to explain, during his testimony, how the fingerprints
could have been his when defendant also put on evidence to
explain why the fingerprints were not his.
2.

Whether there was sufficient evidence, as a matter

of law, to submit the case to the jury when the case consisted of
inconclusive, circumstantial evidence, and the experts called by
the State and the defendant disagreed as to whether the fingerprints on the door of the victim's home could be identified
and classified with reasonable scientific certainty.
3.

Whether the Court erred in allowing heresy evidence

to be introduced regarding the deceased victim's state of mind
relating to her alleged fear of defendant to be introduced when
there was no issues of self defense, suicide, or accident raised
by either party, and whether the Court erred in allowing the
prosecutor to express his personal opinion as to the veracity of
defendant's witnesses and defendant's guilt during the summation
of the case, when such conduct was an obvious violation of the
Canons of Ethics.
4.

Whether the Court erred in allowing the video tape

of the victim's body and the investigation conducted in her

mobile home by the police to be admitted into evidence and shown
to the jury both during plaintifffs case in chief and during the
jury's deliberation, when still photographs had already been
introduced by the State showing the body and the

relevant

furnishings and utensils at the scene, and when such video
concentrated on the dead body and the open throat wound she had
received, thereby inflaming the jury's passions and prejudices.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of defendant,
Jerry J. Dibello, on January 6, 1986 in the Third District Court
in and for Tooele County, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge
presiding, of the crime of Criminal Homicide: Murder ±n the
Second Degree, a 1st Degree Felony in violation of Sec^* n
76-5-203, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and the Order of said Cv
entered March 24, 1986 denying defendant's Motion ior a New Trial
requested on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 9:30 a.m. on July 21, 1985, the body of
Tammy Dibello was discovered in her mobile home located in the
S&W Trailer Park in Lakepoint, Tooele County, Utah by Larry
Smith, a neighbor.

(Testimony of Larry Smith pp. 49-52.)

The

cause of death was determined by Dr. Armano Salazar, who is
employed by the State of Utah, Office of the Medical Examiner, as
multiple stab wounds.
iv

(Testimony of Dr. Salazar, p.310 of the

transcript,)

The defendant, Jerry Dibello, was married to the

victim, but separated from her at the time of her death.
(Testimony of Larry Smith p.45, Teresa Sterns p.86, Shane
Jacobsen pp.162-164, Tracy AA p.653, and Jerry Dibello pp. 867 &
878.)

He had been to the victim's home on the evening of July

20, 1985 to obtain his clothing.

He arrived at the SSeW Trailer

Park sometime between 10:00 p.m. (Testimony of Bill Jackson p.110
and defendant p. 895.) and 11:00 p.m. (Testimony of Dennis
Haggard p. 130.) on July 20, 1985 and found his wife at the
trailer of B.J. Jackson. (Testimony of Bill Jackson pp. 108-109,
Dennis Haggard p.127 and defendant p. 895.)

The defendant then

left B.J. Jackson's trailer and shortly thereafter, the victim
also left Mr. Jackson's trailer. (Testimony of Bill Jackson
p.110, Dennis Haggard pp. 131 & 133, and defendant p. 895.)

No

one reports having seen the victim from that time until her body
was discovered the following morning.

At least one other person,

Shane Jacobsen, admitted to visiting the victim's home that same
night. (Testimony of Shane Jacobsen p. 174.)

A note from Mr.

Jacobsen to the victim, which he admits to writing on the night
of July 20, 1985, was found at the scene of the murder. (Testimony of Shane Jacobsen p. 175 and Alan James p. 714.)
On Monday, July 22, 1985, defendant was arrested in Salt
Lake County for the crime of Second Degree Murder, a 1st Degree
Felony.

Defendant was bound over by the Sixth Circuit Court to

stand trial on August 1, 1985 in the Third District Court in and
for Tooele County, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding.
only physical

The

evidence of the defendant's presence at the
v

premises or connection to the crime presented at trial was a hand
print smeared in blood on the outside of the front door of the
victim's mobile home. (Testimony of Lynn Bush p.693, Alan James
p.709, Plaintiffs Exhibits 4, 27, 30, 31, 32 and 67.)

Finger-

print experts for the prosecution identified the print as being
that of the defendant.

(Testimony of Rick Summers pp. 359-360 &

392 and Scott Pratt p.971.)

Defendant's fingerprint expert, Wade

Robinson, testified the print could not be identified as being
defendant's.
814.)

(Testimony of Wade Robinson pp. 799-801, 808 8c

After the lifting of the prints, there was not sufficient

blood remaining to determine the blood type. (Testimony of Martha
Kerr pp. 452-453.)

A verdict of guilty for the crime charged was

entered on December 18, 1985.

Defendant was sentenced on January

6, 1986 to serve a term of not less than five (5) years and which
may be for life in the Utah State Prison.

Defendant filed a

motion for new trial on January 15, 1986 on the grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct, which motion was denied by the Court in
its Order entered March 24, 1986.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant's argument centers on the misconduct of
the prosecutor, and the errors of the trial court in three areas:
submitting the case to the jury on the evidence presented by the
State, allowing hearsay evidence of the victim's state of mind to
be introduced and allowing the jury to view a color video tape
recording made by the police which concentrated on the corpse at
the scene of the crime when still photographs had already been
introduced of the relevant items existing at the scene.
vi

During closing argument, the prosecutor committed two
egregious errors.

He drew the jurors1 attention to what he

argued was an error in the way the defendant's attorney had
presented his case, and argued that the supposed error was
evidence of the defendant's guilt.

The prosecutor argued that

the defendant was guilty because his attorney had erroneously let
the defendant explain during direct examination how his bloody
hand print could have existed on the door to the victim's
dwelling after the defence had introduced expert testimony which
concluded that the hand print could not be identified scientifically.

The prosecutor also breached the Canons of Ethics by

expressing his personal opinion or judgment regarding

the

veracity of the defendant's witnesses and the guilt of the
defendant. These errors alone are so material as to warrant a
reversal of the defendant's conviction.
The prosecutor's errors during summation become even
more prejudicial and thusly require a reversal when the Court's
errors are considered.

A review of the transcript reveals that

the evidence against the defendant was totally circumstantial
except for the bloody hand print found on the victim's dwelling.
While defendant does not argue that circumstantial evidence is
insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt, in this instance, the
circumstantial which the jury was told was sufficient to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt clearly was not,
and the Court erred in allowing the case to go to the jury.
Particulary was it error to allow the case to go to the

jury when the Court allowed hearsay statements of the deceased
victim to be introduced to the effect that she feared

the

defendant, when there was no issue raised at trial as to selfdefense, suicide or accident, and the state of mind of the victim
was totally irrelevant and immaterial to the issues before the
Court.

Furthermore, the said statements of the victim were not

supported with sufficient indicia of truthfulness to warrant
their admission even if the victim's state of mind had been at
issue.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the misconduct of
the prosecutor is seen to have compounded the errors of the Court
in allowing the video taped investigation of the crime scene to
be shown to the jury.

The tape was filmed from a perspective to

the foot of the victim's corpse and showed the gruesome scene of
her dead and mutilated body for approximately one hour.

The jury

was allowed to view the tape even though still photographs of a
less gruesome and inflammatory nature had already been introduced
by the prosecution.

There was no probative value to be gained by

showing the film to the jury, other than to inflame

their

prejudice and passion for the brutal crime committed upon the
victim.

The film obviously had a dramatic effect in convicting

the defendant, the only person the jury could act out against in
their collective revulsion, because the jury requested, and were
allowed to review the film during their deliberations.
Consequently, the errors committed in the trial of this
case compounded one another, to the point that the defendant was
viii

denied a f a i r
reversed.

and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l , and h i s conviction must be

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
THE PROSECUTOR, UNFAIRLY
WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS
PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL

PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
FOR A NEW TRIAL WHEN
CALLED ATTENTION TO
AN OVERSIGHT ON THE

The Utah Supreme Court has clearly outlined the standards for determining whether or not remarks made by counsel in
their arguments to the jury are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case.

Attorneys have

considerable

latitude in commenting on the evidence during opening statements
and summation.

However, such discretion is not without limits,

and when the comments of counsel would have a tendency to draw
fhe jury's attention away from the issues of fact, and concentrate on what the prosecutor considers an error in the manner in
which defense counsel tried the case, reversal is mandated.
The leading case in the State of Utah with respect to
the issue of when improper comments during a closing argument are
so likely to have influenced the verdict that they require
reversal, is State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, (Utah 1973).

The

facts in that case involve a defendant who was convicted of the
crime of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The defendant in that case did not deny that he shot his

wife but pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Defendant, on appeal, contended that the remarks of the prosecution in rebuttal to defendant's closing argument were improper,
prejudicial and constituted reversible error.
-1-

Defendant failed

to assert an objection during the course of the argument and the
trial court had no opportunity to determine the matter or caution
the jury.

Defendant, because of the special circumstances in

this case, was denied a reversal.

However, the Court sets a very

clear standard for determining whether or not improper comments
of counsel during arguments to the jury require reversal.
Counsel for both sides have considerable
latitude in their arguments to the jury; they
have a right to discuss fully from their
standpoints the evidence and the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom.
The test of
whether the remarks are so objectionable as to
merit a reversal in criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and
were they, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks, (p.426) (Emphasis added)
The test outlined in Valdez is a two part test.

First, the

remarks must be improper and second, they must have probably
influenced the jurors.

The competency of defense counsel or his

'oversights1 are not matters which are properly considered by
jurors in determining their verdict.

Jurors must rely upon the

evidence presented and the credibility of the witnesses in
determining the verdict.
A California case clearly shows that statements disparaging opposing counsel are improper remarks.
People v. Perry, 499 P.2d

In the case of

129, (Cal. 1972), the California

Supreme Court discussed disparaging remarks directed towards
opposing counsel in closing arguments in a homicide case.
Defendant, on appeal, contended that the prosecution's closing

-2-

argument was essentially a personal attack on defense counsel.
The Court finds these disparaging remarks to be improper but
refused to grant a reversal on the basis that the improper
remarks weren't made in a case where it was likely that they
would influence the verdict.

However, the Court indicates that

in certain cases such comments would require reversal because
such remarks would probably influence the verdict.
Unfortunately, we must conclude that the
prosecutor did commit misconduct during his
rebuttal argument; however, we must note that
the improper remarks were made in response to a
highly inflammatory argument made by Redmon's
[defendant's] counsel. Although the remarks of
a defense counsel do not justify retaliation
by the prosecution, such remarks must be
considered in assessing the prejudicial effect
of the prosecutorial misconduct....(p.150)
The rebuttal argument was a response to defense
counsel's inflammatory attack upon the prosecution. It is probable that the jurors viewed
the argument as mere polemic retaliation
intended to rehabilitate the integrity of the
maligned law enforcement agencies and gave it
little or no consideration...For these reasons,
we conclude that the prosecutorial misconduct
was not likely to have caused a miscarriage of
justice, that the objection to the misconduct
was not timely, and therefore that reversal of
the judgment is not justified on this ground,
(p.151)
A case from Nevada agrees with the California court in
holding that remarks disparaging defense counsel constitute
misconduct.
1984).

The case is McGuire v. State, 677 P.2d 1060 (Nev.

This case consolidates two criminal cases; one where the

defendant was convicted of robbery and the second where the
defendant was convicted of sexual assault.

Both cases were tried

by the same prosecutor who engaged in various acts of prose-3-

cutorial misconduct in the two cases.

The Court shows a great

concern for the problem of prosecutorial misconduct and its
effect on the jury and its ultimate result of depriving an
accused of his or her right to a fair trial and the additional
expense incurred in the hearing of appeals and the necessity of a
retrial in many cases.

The statements of the prosecutor in the

second of the consolidated cases served only to belittle defense
counsel,
We can discern no purpose for the statement
other than as an attempt to belittle defense
counsel in front of the jury* * * Disparaging
comments have absolutely no place in a courtroom, and clearly constitute misconduct,
(p.1064)
That case seems to leave no doubt that attempts to
belittle defense counsel or to disparage him or his work are
unquestionably acts of misconduct which necessarily means that
they have met the first step of the Valdez test.

However, just

meeting the first portion of the two-step Valdez test is not
sufficient.

The second step must also be met.

The Utah Supreme

Court discussed the second step of the Valdez test more fully in
the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984).

The Court,

in that case, quoted the language of the Valdez case regarding
the two-part test.

They then continued their discussion and

created specific standards with which to judge step two of the
test:
Step two is more difficult and involves a
consideration of the circumstances of the case
as a whole. In making such a consideration, it
is appropriate to look at the evidence of
defendantf s guilt.

,f

If proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be
presumed pre judicial.ff (Citing cases) Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof,
this Court will more closely scrutinize the
conduct.
If the conclusion of jurors is
based on their weighing conflicting evidence or
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that
they will be improperly influenced through
remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the
jurors may be searching for guidance in
weighing and interpreting the evidence.
They may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be
sufficient to affect the verdict. Counsel is
obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as
possible, any reference to those matters the
jury is not justified in considering.
In this case, there was no compelling proof of
defendant's guilt. The jury could have found
either way. Consequently, we are compelled to
find that the second step of the Valdez test
has been met.
The jurors were t!probably
1
influenced by' the remarks of the prosecutor.
While the trial court properly attempted
to correct the errors, the potential for harm,
the probability for harm, and the continued
efforts of the prosecutor were too flagrant to
be corrected, (pp.486-487)
The decision in Troy defines the type of case where
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor will be presumed
prejudicial.

As required by the Troy decision, the Dibello case

is one where proof of the defendant's guilt was not strong.
case is made up of circumstantial evidence.

This

Conflicting testi-

mony was given concerning every fact in evidence.' The fingerprint experts of the State and the defendant, testified differently concerning the bloody hand print.

The experts who testi-

fied for the State came to the conclusion that the print could be
identified as that of the defendant. (Testimony of Rick Summers
-5-

pp. 359-360 Sc 392 and Scott Pratt p. 971.)

Conflicting testimony

was given by the expert who testified for defendant.

He stated

that the print could not be identified as that of defendant.
(Testimony of Wade Robinson pp. 799-801.)

The blood which was

found on the door was unable to be typed and defendant had a
possible explanation for its present there even if it were found
to be his hand print. (Testimony of Martha Kerr pp. 452-453 and
defendant pp. 938 & 946.)

Two versions were given of the

behavior of defendant when intoxicated. (Testimony of Bill
Russell p.545, Kristi Dibello Russell p. 590, Gary Barker p.837,
Cordell Griffiths p.841, and Rex Nielsen p.848.)

Conflicting

evidence was given as to every fact discussed at trial.

This

case is clearly the type of case defined in Troy.
One further misconduct of the prosecutor which demands
reversal occurred in his closing arguments where he indicated his
personal belief in Jerry Dibello1s guilt and implied that defense
witnesses should not be believed.

During his closing arguments,

the prosecutor said,
I hope you looked at the defendant closely, but
I suggest to you that it is evident, based on
what you observed and the other testimony in
this case, that the defendant did not tell the
truth as to what he did on July 20. I think he
lied about what happened also up in Settlement
Canyon, (p.35)
You have the statement where he said there
isn't any blood on my shoes. How about your
shoes? He comments that there's no blood on my
shoes. Again, I think it's evident that he knew
he wasn't wearing those, (p.37)
[In referring to Wade Robinson, defendant's
fingerprint expert.] I think he caught himself
-6-

up when he was t e s t i f y i n g . . . I think he probably
b i t off a l i t t l e more than he c o u l d chew,
(p.30)
And I think he was wrong in one statement he
made.
I think when the d e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e r t
says, I'm not able to make an explanation; and
I think he made an error when he s a i d , since I
c a n ' t make an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , I have to exclude
the defendant, (p.59)
Behavior of exactly t h i s s o r t was discussed in the case
of State v. Reed, 684 P.2d 699 (Wash. 1984).
Court r e f e r s

In t h a t c a s e , the

to a d i s c i p l i n a r y rule which i s v i o l a t e d by such

behavior on the part of the prosecutor.
The Code of P r o f e s s i o n a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , DR
7 - 1 0 6 ( 0 ( 4 ) , s t a t e s u n e q u i v o c a b ly that: an
a t t o r n e y s h a l l not [ a j s s e r t h i s personal
opinion as to the j u s t n e s s of a c a u s e , as to
t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s , . . . o r as to
the g u i l t of innocence of an a c c u s e d ; but he
may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for
any p o s i t i o n or conclusion with respect to the
matters s t a t e d h e r e i n .
Here the prosecutor c l e a r l y v i o l a t e d (CPR) DR
7 - 1 0 6 ( 0 ( 4 ) by a s s e r t i n g his personal o p i n i o n
of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witness and the g u i l t
or innocence of the accused. F i r s t , he c a l l e d
the p e t i t i o n e r a l i a r no l e s s than four times.
Next, the prosecutor s t a t e d t h a t the defense
c o u n s e l did not have a c a s e , and t h a t the
p e t i t i o n e r was c l e a r l y a " m u r d e r t o o " .
F i n a l l y , he implied t h a t the defense witnesses
should not be b e l i e v e d . . . .
"Language which might be permitted to counsel
in summing up a c i v i l a c t i o n c a n n o t w i t h
p r o p r i e t y be used by a public prosecutor, who
i s a q u a s i - j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r , r e p r e s e n t i n g the
P e o p l e of t h e s t a t e , and presumed to a c t
i m p a r t i a l l y in the i n t e r e s t only of j u s t i c e .
If he lays aside the i m p a r t i a l i t y t h a t should
c h a r a c t e r i z e his o f f i c i a l a c t i o n to become a
heated p a r t i s a n , and by v i t u p e r a t i o n of the
prisoner and a p p e a l s to p r e j u d i c e , seeks to
procure a conviction at a l l hazards, he ceases
t o p r o p e r l y r e p r e s e n t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ,
-7-

which demands no victim, and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, sympathy or
resentment,ff (p. 702)
The prosecutor

in the Dibello matter called Jerry

Dibello a liar or indicated that he, himself, thought that Jerry
Dibello was lying at least twice.
witnesses should not be believed.

He implied that defense

Rather than simply pointing

out inconsistencies or possible attacks on the credibility of
defendant
and defense witnesses, the prosecutor in this action asserted his
personal belief as to the credibility of defendant and defense
witnesses.
It should also be mentioned that the State of Utah has
clearly recognized the right of a defendant to assert inconsistent defenses, the very thing which prosecutor attacked in his
closing arguments.

In the case of State v. Mitcheson, 560 P. 2d

1120, 1122 (Utah 1977), the Court said this:
It is our judgment that the position of the
defendant * * * is not necessarily inconsistent. ..Furthermore, even if they were
inconsistent, that should not deprive the
defendant of either defense.
In a criminal case the defendant need not
specially plead his defenses. The entry of a
plea of not guilty places upon the State the
burden of proving every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This gives the
defendant the benefit of every defense thereto
which may cause a reasonable doubt to exist as
to his guilt, arising either from the evidence,
or lack of evidence, in the case; and this is
true whether his defenses are consistent or
not.

-8-

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THERE
WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
SUBMIT THIS CASE TO THE JURY
It is well established that the burden of proof in a
criminal case lies with the State.

The State has the burden of

proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
defendant has no obligation to prove any affirmative defense.

The
In

order to meet this burden, the State must present a prima facie
case.

The Supreme Court of Utah has, in numerous cases, stated

that in presenting defenses in criminal cases, a defendant does
not bear the burden of persuasion.

The Court in State v. Torres,

619 p.2d 694,695 (Utah 1980) reemphasized the allocation of
burdens in criminal cases.
It is sufficient for acquittal that the
evidence or lack thereof creates a reasonable
doubt as to any element of the crime, (citing
cases) The ultimate burden of proving the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
remains on the state, whether defendant offers
any evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not.
The standard by which an appellate court must determine whether
or not a verdict should be set aside is stated in State v.
Sullivan, 307 P.2d 212 (Utah 1957).
The defendants' essay to demonstrate that the
evidence leaves such doubt as to their identification as the culprits in this crime that
they were entitled to a dismissal. For them to
prevail on that proposition it must appear
that, viewing the evidence and all fair
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
reasonable minds could not believe them guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, but would neces-

-9-

sarily entertain some substantial doubt of
their guilt, (p.214)
But it is not sufficient merely that reasonable
minds may have entertained such doubt. Before
a verdict may properly be set aside, it must
appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting
fairly upon it must have entertained reasonable
doubt that defendant committed the crime.
Unless the evidence compels such conclusion as
a matter of law, the verdict must stand,
(p.215)
The evidence in the Dibello case is so inconclusive that
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the defendant.

All of the evidence against the defen-

dant in this case is circumstantial, and while that is not
to say that the State could not convict on circumstantial
evidence, it is to suggest that before it can convict there must
be sufficient evidence to carry the prosecution's burden.

The

evidence here consists of the following:
1) the defendant and the victim were married
and were separated at the time of the murder (Testimony of Larry
Smith p.45, Teresa Stearns p.86, Shane Jacobsen pp.162-164, Tracy
AA p.653 and defendant pp.867 & 878.).
2) the defendant came to the S&W Trailer park
to see his wife, the night of the murder (Testimony of Bill
Jackson p.110, Dennis Haggar p.130 and defendant p.895.),
3) defendant indicated to his wife at the
trailer of B.J. Jackson that he had returned to the trailer park
to pick up some of his clothing.
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4) defendant entered the trailer where the
victim was murdered on the night of July 20, 1985, in order to
pick up his clothes (Testimony of defendant pp.900 & 938.).
5) the victim left the trailer of B.J. Jackson
shortly after the defendant left that trailer (Testimony of Bill
Jackson p.110, Dennis Haggard pp.131 8c 133 and defendant p.895).
6) there were bloody fingerprints on the
outside door of the trailer, which may or may not have been the
defendant's (Testimony of Rick Summers, Scott Pratt and Wade
Robinsons).
7) the victim had, in her hand, two hairs
which may or may not have been defendant's (Testimony of Martha
pp.431-435), and,
8) there were traces of blood in the defendant's truck, on a shirt and on his person, the only sample of
blood which was large enough to be typed was taken from the shirt
and matched defendant's blood type, not that of the victim.
(Testimony of Martha Kerr, p.456.)
The evidence of defendant's guilt is extremely sparse,
and inconclusive.

The only evidence which is truly relevant to

the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence is controverted.

The

fingerprint experts of the State and the defendant testified
differently as to the identification of the prints found on the
outside door of the trailer where the victim \*is found.

The

expert for the State said that they could be identified as the
defendant's, the expert for defendant said that they could not be
-11-

identified as those of the defendant.

The traces of blood found

on the defendant and in his truck could be explained by the
testimony given in the trial as to a fight that occurred between
defendant and Larry Smith on the night of July 15, 1986.

This

would correspond with the testimony of Martha Kerr that the trace
of blood which would be typed were identified as type B which is
the type of the defendant while the victim was type 0.
As stated in the Sullivan and Torres cases, supra, the
defendant does not have the burden of proving his innocence.
is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

He

In this case, the

State failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to justify a
determination of guilt on the part of the defendant.

The

evidence is entirely circumstantial and so inconclusive that
reasonable minds, acting only upon the evidence presented and
their determination of the credibility of the witnesses would
necessarily have to have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.

The State, in its closing argument,

relied heavily on supposition, creating a case wherein defendant
was motivated by jealousy to murder his wife.

In closing, the

State referred to a letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit 65, and read from
it referring to the victim's feelings towards defendant and her
attitude on her marriage.

The letter and the prosecutor's

prejudicial statements previously mentioned, played a large part
in the State's closing argument which was the first time it was
read.

The evidence does not call for a conviction of defendant

but rather an acquittal.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ALLOWING HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED
REGARDING THE VICTIM'S STATE OF MIND AND
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO COMMENT ON THE SAME
WHEN NO EVIDENCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, SUICIDE OR
ACCIDENT WAS INTRODUCED BY THE STATE OR THE
DEFENDANT.
Hearsay evidence and the rules pertaining to it are some
of the most complicated and controversial areas of the law.

The

very fact that in the Utah Code, Rules of Evidence, Rules 803 and
804, there are a total of twenty-nine statutory exceptions to the
hearsay rule, twenty-four for when the declarant is available and
five pertaining to situations where the declarant is unavailable,
indicates the complex nature of the issue of hearsay and exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Case law has clarified many of

the exceptions and indicated when they are available and when
they are not.
The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d
1377, 1380 & 1381 (Utah 1977), discussed the admission of
pre-death hearsay statements of a victim in a homicide case.

The

Court held, in a situation which parallels, almost exactly, the
Dibello case, that pre-death hearsay statements concerning the
victim's fear of the defendant are not admissable.

The state-

ments had been allowed in under Rule 63 (12) of thk Utah Rules of
Evidence.

The rules of evidence have subsequently been altered

and renumbered

and the exception is now Rule 803(3).

Supreme Court has this to say,
Pre-death hearsay statements of a victim in
homicide cases are generally admissable when
-13-

The

the defendant claims self-defense. They may
also be properly admitted where the defense is
that the death was accidental and that the
victim was an aggressor. They are not generally admitted in criminal cases where selfdefense is not* at issue* * * * . Wfrer^ it iso
claimed the deceased committed suicide there
would seem to be relevance in the hearsay
statements of the decedent which would tend to
explain acts or conduct on the part of the
declarant * * *
Whether the victim loved or hated the defendant, or whether she feared him or ignored him
throws no light on his guilt or innocence. The
jurors were most likely to believe that the
statements made by the wife were true and that
the defendant had beaten her and threatened to kill her; therefore, he did kill her.
(emphasis added).
The Court, in that case, reversed the conviction.
situation in Wauneka closely parallels the Dibello facts.

The
In

Wauneka, the defendant was charged with the crime of murder in
the second degree and found guilty of manslaughter.

The evidence

admitted was a statement made by the deceased to an acquaintance
about five days before her death.

The statement was to the

effect that if the defendant found out that the deceased had
called the police about his beating her, he would kill her.
In the Dibello case, two separate incidents involving
hearsay statements of the deceased were introduced by the
prosecution at trial, the first occurred during the testimony of
Shane Jacobsen where he testified that the victim had said to
him,

lf

Tammy asked me if I didn't mind staying with her because

she was frightened of Jerry11, (p.162) and the second was a
letter, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 65, which was admitted into
evidence during the testimony of Tracy AA. (p.652).

A portion of

that letter was first read by the prosecutor to the jury during
his closing arguments, (p.31).

The portion read by the prose-

cutor follows:
Jerry, the romance has left your heart and, I
guess, mine, too. I can't even talk to you
anymore because I am afraid of you. You have
done all you can for me and I'm afraid of you.
Don't you think that's silly?
This portion of the letter is not even as probative as the
statements which were not allowed to be introduced in the Wauneka
case.

The letter written by Tammy Dibello was intended for her

husband, only.

In the Wauneka case, the statement was made to an

acquaintance while the deceased was seeking help.
for help, for someone to call the police.

She was asking

A letter intended for

the eyes of the defendant, is not relevant to the issue of guilt
or innocence.

The letter failed to state why the victim was

afraid of the defendant or in what way and it is entirely
unrelated to defendant's attitude toward his wife.

The letter

merely reflects Tammy Dibellofs feelings at some, unknown point
in time.

Neither does the statement purportedly made by the

victim to Shane Jacobsen explain her fear.

It doesn't say if

she's afraid the defendant will return to work things out or hurt
her physically or whatever else her fear may have been.

These

are the very reasons why hearsay evidence is not ,admissable.

If

the victim were available to testify, perhaps she could clear up
any mystery surrounding her statements, but that is not possible.
Furthermore, according to the Wauneka decision, the
attitude of the deceased toward the defendant, is not relevant or
-15-

admissable in a homicide case unless the issues of self-defense,
suicide or accident are raised.

Those issues were not raised

here, by either the defendant or the State.

Therefore, the

holding in the Wauneka decision must be controlling here, and
this case must be reversed.
Furthermore, neither the statement in the letter nor the
testimony of Shane Jacobsen meet the standards of Rule 804(b)(5),
Utah Rules of Evidence, U.C.A., 1953, as amended which reads, in
pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness.* * * (5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
if the court determines that (A) the statement
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interest of
justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence, (emphasis added).
The statements admitted in the Dibello case do not meet
the standards set by Rule 804(b)(5).

There is no equivalent

circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.

The exceptions are

based upon circumstances where it would be unlikely that the
declarant was lying.

The exceptions for when the declarant is

not available to testify concern former testimony, including
depositions, where the statements are transcribed before a court
reporter or stenographer while the declarant is under oath.

The

second exception is a statement under belief of impending death,
-16-

the third, a statement against interest and the fourth, a
statement of personal or family history.

These exceptions are

limited to times when it was unlikely that the declarant was
lying or exaggerating.

Neither the statements in the letter or

the statement purportedly made to Shane Jacobsen are not of this
quality at all.

There were no special circumstances which would

indicate that the things said were true.

The statements of the

deceased with respect to her fear of the defendant, were made
without explanation.

The deceased merely said that she was

afraid of the defendant.

The general purpose of the rules of

evidence is to be as certain as is reasonably possible, that the
evidence presented in a courtroom is true, or at least contains
some truth or there is some likelihood that the statements are
true.

That is the reason for the oaths that witnesses take and

the rules of evidence which operate in a court of law.
our minds, is the best insurance of justice.

Truth, to

Here, there is no

guarantee of truth and no opportunity for explanation in order to
discover the truth.

Therefore, these statements should not have

been admitted into evidence or heard by the jury.
Another statement was admitted into evidence in contravention of the Rules of Evidence.

Tinly Gibbons, during her

testimony, testified that during a conversation with the defendant on July
Dibello.

13, 1985, defendant threatened to kill Tammy

fl

And then Jerry said that if Tammy ever left him that

he would kill her." (p.488)

Even if the statement could be

proven to be relevant, it still was prejudicial error to admit it
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into evidence under Rule 4U3, U.C.A. Rules of Evidence, 1953, as
amended, which reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 403 clearly

indicates that evidence which is

relevant, may still be excluded when its probative value is
outweighed by its tendency to prejudice.

In this case, the

probative value of the statement is slight.

It does not relate

to the situation existing at the time of the victimfs death.
Even, if the defendant had actually meant that statement or
intended it as a threat or indication of future action, the facts
introduced at trial, show that defendant left his wife, not that
his wife left him.

Even if relevant, the prejudicial value of

this statement strongly outweighs its probative value.

The

prejudice created by the admission of such a statement is great.
The jury is likely to believe that the defendant simply followed
up on his threat.
slight.

The probative value of the statement is

It doesn't actually involve the defendant in the murder,

it doesn't relate to any of the physical evidence presented and
it doesnft show the defendant's state of mind on the night of
July 20, 1986.
Clearly, the trial court committed prejudicial error
which mandates a reversal ^hen it admitted the foregoing hearsay
evidence as to the decedent's state of mind.

The Court also
-18-

erred in admitting defendants statement when that statement was
not related to the circumstances exiting at the time of defendant's wife or to the time immediately preceding her death.
It was simply one of those off the cuff statements many men make,
but which do not express actual animus towards their wives.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE VIDEO TAPE OF THE VICTIM'S
BODY AND THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN HER
MOBILE HOME BY THE POLICE TO BE ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AND SHOWN TO THE JURY BOTH DURING
PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF AND DURING THE JURY'S
DELIBERATION.
Video tapes are a relative newcomer in the field of
criminal investigation.

Their impact on a jury has been careful-

ly analyzed because the old adage, though trite, is true: one
picture is worth a thousand words.
impact than language.
sion.

Pictures create a greater

Video tapes make an even stronger impres-

The thing of importance in a court of law is not sympathy

or shock.

The jury should be concerned with facts and matters of

evidence.

Courts have expressed the fear that pictures and video

tapes of murder victims may arouse a blood-lust in the jury, a
shock and horror which only finds its outlet in a scapegoat,
which, in a criminal action, is obviously the defendant.

The

Supreme Court of Utah discussed that admission into evidence of
slides made of the victim during the course of the autopsy.
These slides were shown to the jury on a screen set up in the
courtroom.
-19-

The defense counsel failed to make a proper objection

to the admission of the slides.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court

found the admission of the slides to be prejudicial error and
proper grounds for reversal of the judgment and remand in the
case of State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 514-515 (Utah 1968).
Finally, defendant contends the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting some colored
slides into evidence and permitting them to be
displayed to the jury by means of a slide
projector and screen. With this contention, we
are in agreement.
To begin with, the identity of the deceased,
his death and its cause had already been
established * * *
Initially, it is within the sound discretion of
the trial court to determine whether the
inflammatory nature of such slides is outweighed by their probative value with respect
to a fact in issue. If the latter they may be
admitted even though gruesome. In the instant
case they had no probative value. All the
material facts which could conceivably have
been adduced from a viewing of the slides had
been established by uncontradicted lay and
medical testimony. The only purpose served was
to inflame and arouse the jury.
In the Dibello case, the identity of the victim and the cause of
death were already established.

Neither the identity of the

victim nor the cause of death were at issue.

Both sides were in

complete agreement that the victim was Tammy Dibello and that the
cause of death was multiple stab wounds.

The State introduced

testimony from Dr. Armano Salazar which discussed in detail the
injuries sustained by the victim, the condition of the body and
the cause of death.

The video tape does not meet the standard

created in State v. Poe.
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The inflammatory nature of a video tape showing the
victim1 s body was not outweighed by the probative value of the
tape with respect to a

act in issue.

Prior to the introduction

of the tape, the jury had already been shown several pictures of
the victim.

Plaintiff's Exhibits1 6, 9, and 10 were photographs

of the victim, after death.
victim.

P-10 showed the stab wound to the

P-6 and P-9 showed the body of the victim.

The video-

tape of the victim added nothing new to the juryfs knowledge.

It

only served to shock them with an extremely unpleasant representation of a murder victim.
of the murder.

The video tape also showed the site

However, the site of the murder was discussed and

explained in Plaintifffs Exhibits 5, 74 and 75.

P-5 was a chart

of the trailer layout and it was representative of the condition
of the trailer at the time of the murder.

P-74 and P-75 were

photographs of the inside of the Dibello trailer.

Alan James

testified that they accurately represented the Dibello trailer on
the day he made his investigation, July 21, 1985. (T. pp. 723725).

The video tape showed the door to the trailer which was

also shown in Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 27, 30 and 32. Once again,
the evidence is redundant.

Also, it displayed the wood block

which held knives which was introduced into evidence as P-72.
All of the information presented by the video tape was redundant
and had either already been testified to or was shortly to be
testified to, all of it with visual aids, either the actual
object(s) or a photographic representation of the object(s).
Even if there had not been other evidence introduced with respect
-21-

to these matters, they could have been shown on the video tape
without displaying the victim's body which could have been edited
out or fast-forwarded over.

The video tapes did not serve to

inform the jury, or give them any evidence with respect to a fact
in issue.

Their only purpose and effect was to shock, inflame

and arouse the jury.
The Utah Supreme Court has not abandoned their views on
the possible harms of visual evidence of victims1 bodies.

It has

restated its position in the case of State v. Wells, 603 P.2d
810, 813 (Utah 1979).

That case involved a shooting.

was charged with manslaughter and found guilty.

Defendant
During the

trial, color photographs of the bullet wound were admitted into
evidence.

The pictures depict a close-up view of a bullet wound

in the deceased's chest.

On appeal, the defendant claimed that

the photographs had no probative value and served only to inflame
and prejudice the jury.

The Court found that the admission of

the photographs was error but not prejudicial error and therefore, not reversible.
We have reviewed the photographs of which
the defendant complains and find that they are
not gruesome or offensive such that in their
absence there would have been a reasonable
probability or likelihood the result would have
been more favorable to the defendant. * * *
Because the defendant did not dispute
shooting Dirks, and because the medical
examiner testified that the victim died as a
result of the gunshot, the admission of the
photographs was superfluous. We do not condone
the admission of the photographs in this
case, since we are able to find no evidentiary
value for the photographs other than the
hoped-for emotional impact on the jury.
-22-

The Court found, in that case, that the error was not
such as would require a reversible, because it was a harmless
error.

The defendant in that case admitted to shooting the

victim but claimed it was a case of self-defense.

The pictures

did not show the victim, just the bullet wound to his chest. The
evidence supporting self-defense was very slim.

The defendant,

at the time of his arrest, informed the police that he "shot the
son-of-a-bitch because he owed me $243.00 for a phone bill.11

The

defendant had threatened the victim's life in the presence of
several witnesses a few days earlier.
in the Dibello case.

Such is not the situation

The evidence presented by the State

relating to the guilt of the defendant was circumstantial and
conflicting testimony was given with respect to the identification of the bloody fingerprints.

The defendant did not

admit to murdering his wife, self defense was not an issue.
Furthermore, the videotape didn't just show the wounds, they
showed the victim, as she was found, the morning after her
murder.

A videotape of a woman lying lifeless, in glorious

color, stained with blood, and a gaping wound across her throat
is a much harder picture to be objective about than a close-up of
a bullet wound with no fact attached, no person attached to the
wound.

The jury knew that the victim in Wells had been murdered,

but they never saw him dead.

Viewing death can create feelings

of fear, helplessness, rage and many other strong emotions.
These emotions can influence a jury.

They've seen a murder,

something which shouldn't have happened and they want to avenge,
-23-

to punish and the only logical outlet for those feelings in a
criminal case is the defendant.
The introduction of a videotape of the victim in a case
where the information displayed by the tape was redundant and had
no probative value can only serve to inflame the jury.

The

Court, in Wells, refused to reverse the verdict because they
found that the harm done by the admission of the photos was not
prejudicial because there was not a reasonable probability or
likelihood that in the absence of those photos, there would have
been a result more favorable to the defendant.

In the Dibello

case, the evidence supporting the Statefs case against the
defendant is very weak.

In fact, as argued in Point III, the

evidence wasn't sufficient to support the verdict rendered.

The

videotape of the victim clearly influenced the jury in their
rendering of a verdict, as indicated by the jury's request to
view the video film after retiring.

Errors which are harmless in

cases where the evidence is strong in support of either party are
prejudicial in cases where the evidence is conflicting and fails
to clearly support either party.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of State of
Garcia , 663 P2.d 60, 64 (Utah 1983), again emphasized its
position with respect to the question of photographs of a
homicide victim.
The p o i n t of t h e r e f e r e n c e t o " e s s e n t i a l
e v i d e n t i a r y value 1 ' in t h e c o n t e x t of p o t e n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c i a l photographs of the v i c t i m ' s
body i s t h a t such photographs would g e n e r a l l y
be i n a p p r o p r i a t e where t h e o n l y r e l e v a n t
evidence they convey can be put before the j u r y
-24-

readily and accurately by other means not
accompanied by the potential prejudice.
In the Dibello case, not only could the evidence have
been

'readily and accurately1

conveyed by other means, not

accompanied by the potential prejudice, but in fact, the evidence
was so conveyed.
superfluous

The admission of the videotape was entirely

and only served to shock and arouse the jury.

Obviously the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to
introduce the video tape when it was so clearly cumulative on
those issues where probative, and extremely inflammatory in over
all nature.

Reversal is the only remedy for such a gross

discretionary violation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Jerry DiBello was tried and convicted on
circumstantial evidence which was marginal as to its probative
value of guilt.

The only evidence which may have had any real

value in determining the defendantfs guilt was the finger prints
on the door, and the defendant's expert certainly raised reasonable doubt as to whether reliance on the reliability of that
evidence could be had by the jury.

The State committed gross

error in commenting on the veracity of the defendant's witnesses,
the defendant's own testimony, and alleging that the defendant's
counsel hau UUL proper A^ ^itocuucu Lis case.

The Court should

have granted a new trial on that issue alone.

Unfortunately for

Jerry DiBello, the Court also erred in allowing the inflamitory
video tape of the crime scene and Jerry's wife's lifeless body
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which was

almost constantly before the viewer with multiple stab

wounds and a cut throat to be seen by the jury when its viewing
could have had no probative value.
Defendant respectfully submits that this is a case which
cries out for relief.

Jerry DiBello was not convicted by a jury

viewing dispassionately evidence sufficient to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty.

He was tried and convicted

as a consequence of prosecutor misconduct, innuendo and inflammatory evidence which the trial court allowed to go to the
jury.

While is it always in the public interest to seek a

criminal conviction of the guilty party in a homicide situation,
there is a greater public interest in seeing that the guilty
party is brought to justice, and justice requires that the rules
and laws be followed.

In the instant case, justice was denied

its reward, because of the prejudicial errors committed during
the trial of the defendant.

Jerry DiBello, an innocent man, was

convicted as a consequence of those prejudicial errors, and does
respectfully request that the conviction be reversed.
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